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The State Constitutional Right to Privacy Conflicts
with Tax Reporting Requirements: The Florida
Model
Daniel R. Gordon*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The State of Florida's urgent need to improve the effectiveness of
its state tax collection system 1 conflicts with the Florida state constitutional right to privacy. 2 Like many "sunbelt states," Florida is experiencing strong population growth. 3 Current projections indicate that the
recent population explosion will continue over the next twenty years.''
The Florida state government is faced with the challenge of expanding
services in order to keep pace. 5 To do so, Florida must raise more tax
revenues. 6 One readily available way to increase tax revenues is to improve the efficiency of collecting already existing taxes. In 1985 7 and
• Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida.
I. The urgent need to improve tax collection arises not only from population growth creating
strains on government services (See infra notes 2-5 and accompanying text) but also from legal
and political constraints on the state authority to tax. Florida restricts the use of income and
inheritance taxes. See FLA. CoNST. art. vn) § 5. The citizens of Florida politically resist new
taxes even in the face of a growing awareness of the need to improve services. See THE JouRNAL
OF THE SENATE, Number 2 - Special Session B, September 22, 1987 (recording the start of a
special session of the Florida Legislature devoted to repealing or weakening the newly enacted
sales tax on services).
2. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23.
3. See BuREAU oF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT OF CoMMt:RCE, PuB. No. PC80-I-AI, 1980
CENSUS OF POPULATION, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, UNITED STATES SUMMARY, at 1-43
(1983). Florida grew from 4,951,560 people in 1960 to 9,746,324 in 1980.
4. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF CENSUS, SERIES P-25, No. 937 PROVISIONAL PROJECTIONS OF THE PoPULATION OF STATES, BY AGE AND SEX: 1980 TO 2000, at II,
(1983). Florida will grow to 13,316,000 inhabitants by 1990 and 17,438,000 inhabitants by 2000.
5. A recent example of the state's struggle to keep pace with population growth is the 1987
special session of the Florida Legislature which was devoted to overcoming prison overcrowding.
See FLORIDA STATE SENATE jOURNAL, Number 1 - Special Session A (Wed. Feb. 4, 1987).
Prison overcrowding arises from a number of sources, but certainly the growth in population plays
a role.
6. A dramatic example of the State's commitment to raise more tax revenues are the amendments to the State sales tax abolishing large numbers of exemptions. See 1987 Florida Laws,
Chapter 87-72.
7. See 1985 Fla. Laws 85-342, § 4.
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1986, 8 the Florida Legislature amended the state intangible personal
property tax in order to assure that more Floridians pay that tax.
The Legislature enhanced financial data reporting requirements, 9
enabling the State of Florida to learn more about the finances and assets of individuals and corporations. 10 The expanding capabilities of the
state government to gain more personal information means less privacy
protection for personal financial information. 11 This expansion of state
power to discover personal information collides with the state constitutional protection of individual privacy. 12 Following is a short overview
of the intangible property tax, 13 an examination of the enhanced data
reporting requirements/ 4 an overview of the Florida constitutional provision protecting privacy/ 11 and an analysis of how the enhanced reporting requirements violate the state constitutional privacy provision. 16

II.

THE FLORIDA INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX

The Florida intangible personal property tax 17 raises over
$250,000,000 in revenues for state government. 18 The Florida Department of Revenue 19 administers the tax, making collections and taking
enforcement steps when the tax is not paid. 20 The tax is paid either on
an annual basis 21 or a non-recurring basis. 22 Subject to taxation is all
personal property "which is not itself intrinsically valuable, but which
derives its chief value from that which it represents .... " 23 This is a
tax on negotiable paper and other "symbols" of equity, debt, and certain real property obligations.
8. See 1986 Fla. Laws 86-152.
9. /d.
10. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 49-73 and accompanying text.
12. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23.
13. See infra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 43-73 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 74-161 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 162-227 and accompanying text.
17. FLA. STAT.,§ 199 (1987). Chapter 199 is known as the "Intangible Personal Property
Tax Act". FLA. STAT. § 199.012 (1987).
18. See BuREAU oF EcoNOMIC AND BusiNESS RESEARCH, CoLLEGE OF BusiNEss ADMINISTRATION, UNIVt:RSITY OF FLORIDA, 1986 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, at 561. The revenues from the intangible property tax are deposited in a separate trust fund, and are disbursed for
a variety of government services including the collection of a number of taxes by the Department
of Revenue, revenue sharing with the counties, and services paid for by the State's General Revenue Fund.
19. FLA. STAT. § 199.023(5) (Supp. 1988).
20. FLA. STAT. § 199.202 (1987).
21. FLA. STAT. § 199.052 (1987).
22. FLA. STAT. § 199.133 (1987).
23. FLA. STAT. § 199.023 (Supp. 1988).

55]

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

57

The taxable property includes stocks, 2 " business trusts, 211 mutual
funds, 26 notes, 27 bonds, 28 accounts receivable, 29 and a restricted class of
real property leaseholds. 30 Excluded from taxation are cash, franchises,
partnership interests, certain government obligations, certain retirement
assets, and restricted classes of other notes, assets, and obligations. 31 An
annual tax of one mill 32 is imposed on each dollar of intangible personal property owned, controlled, or managed 33 by individuals, corporations, partnerships, and others3 " who are legal residents of Florida on
January P 11 or who on January 1, regardless of domicile, have an intangible property interest with a business situs in Florida. 36 The due
date for the annual tax is June 30. 37
The annual tax is based on the value of intangible property as of
January 1. 38 Exempt from the annual tax are "notes, bonds, and other
obligations for the payment of money which are secured by mortgage,
deed of trust, or other lien upon real property situated in the state." 39
Such intangible property is subject to a two mill non-recurring tax." 0
This taxation scheme requires that the Department of Revenue
learn of the existence and location of intangible personal property and
certain real property interests." 1 Such data collection is an onerous and
complex task, and the Florida Legislature has granted the Department
of Revenue the means to collect and enforce the intangible personal
property tax. 42
24. FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
25. /d.
26. /d.
27. FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).
28. ld.
29. !d.
30. "All condominium and cooperative apartment leases of recreation facilities, land leases,
and leases of other commonly used facilities." FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(c) (Supp. 1988).
31. FLA. STAT.§ 199.185 (1987).
32. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1987).
33. FLA. STAT. § 199.052(1) (1987).
34. /d. and FLA. STAT. § 199.023(3) (Supp. 1988).
35. FLA. STAT. § 199.052(1) (1987).
36. ld.
37. FLA. STAT. § 199.042(1) (1987).
38. FLA. STAT. § 199.103 (Supp. 1988).
39. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1987).
40. FLA. STAT.§§ 199.133 and 199.135 (1987).
41. The Department of Revenue needs data on real property in Florida because the nonrecurring tax involves notes, bonds and other obligations secured by instruments like mortgages.
See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text. Hence, the Department of Revenue must be
cognizant of real property transactions involving debt instruments in order to enforce Chapter 199.
42. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
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INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX INFORMATION
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The Department of Revenue depends on individual and corporate
taxpayers to supply information concerning the ownership and control
of intangible property interests. For the annual intangible tax, the Department of Revenue requires the filing of an annual return by June
30. 43 The return requires the listing of the character, description, just
valuation 44 and location 45 of all intangible personal property. However,
the Florida Legislature deems it insufficient to rely solely on self-reporting by taxpayers. 46 A number of third-party reporting techniques
have been created to aid in the collection of the intangible tax. Corporations doing business in Florida must file with the Department of
Revenue a list of stockholders and information about the valuation of
their stock. 47 Fiduciaries must file a copy of inventories required to be
prepared for or filed in circuit court. 48 However, the two third-party
reporting procedures that are most intrusive involve stockbrokers and
foreign taxing authorities. The balance of this article examines both
third party reporting procedures and the state constitutional right to
privacy.

A.

Stockbrokers Must File Annual Reports Concerning Their Clients

Stockbrokers registered in compliance with Florida Statutes 49 must
file with the Department of Revenue by June 30 a "position statement" detailing customers' assets held by the stockbroker. 50 Such a filing is made for each customer who has a Florida mailing address, 51 and
the statement provides information about a customer's financial position
as of December 31 of the preceding year. 52 Information about the customer includes name, address, and social security or federal identification number. 53 The enhanced reporting requirements involve a description of the assets. As of 1987, stockbrokers are required to provide more
43. FLA. STAT. § 199.052(1) (1987).
44. ld.
45. FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. r. 12C-2.008(1)(a) (1987).
46. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.062(1) and (2) (1987) and FLA. ADMIN. Com: ANN. r. 12C2.008(1)(a) (1987).
48. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(4) (1987).
49. FLA. STAT.§ 517.12 (1987).
50. FLA. STAT.§ 199.062(3) (1987). However, FLA. ADMIN. Com: ANN.r. 12C-2.008(1)(b)
provides that stockbrokers furnish the position statement by April 1.
51. FLA. STAT.§ 199.062(3) (1987).
52. ld.
53. /d.
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than just "the number and description of all securities held for the customer."54 Stockbrokers must now provide "the number of units, value,
and description, including the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number, if any, of all securities held for the
customer .... " 55 There is not only an increase in the amount of data to
be reported by securities dealers but also an improvement in reporting
technology. Brokers are required to report on magnetic media, unless
they can demonstrate undue hardship. 56 The Department of Revenue is
authorized to promulgate specifications and instructions for magnetic
media reports. 57 The Department of Revenue is also authorized to require stockbrokers to include in the position statements "such other information as the department may reasonably require." 58
The brokerage reporting requirements should not be taken lightly.
If a security broker does not file a position statement in a timely fashion, the broker is subject to a $100 late filing penalty. 59 If general penalty provisions of the Intangible Personal Property Tax Act are read
broadly, brokers face even stiffer penalties for noncompliance. A broker who willfully fails to comply with the reporting provision may be
guilty of a third degree felony, 60 resulting in a prison term not exceeding five years 61 and a fine not exceeding $5,000. 62 Also, the Department of Revenue may examine at reasonable hours brokers' books,
records, and documents pertinent to position statements. 63 If a broker
refuses to permit such an examination, the Department of Revenue
may apply to a circuit court for appropriate relief. 64
The Florida Legislature and Department of Revenue have made
stockbrokers important sources of private financial information about
their customers.

54.

FLA. STAT.

§ 199.062(3) (1987).

55. /d.
56. /d.
57. /d.
58. /d.
59.

FLA. STAT.

§ 199.282(6)(b) (1987).

60. FLA. STAT. § 199.282(1) (1987). The criminal penalty provisions are written particularly broadly. The penalties apply to "any person," and noncompliance involves "any of the provisions of this chapter." The chapter referred to is 199, the intangible tax chapter. Hence, arguably,
the criminal penalties apply to brokers who willfully disobey.
61.

FLA. STAT.

§ 775.082(3)(d) (1987).

§ 775.083(1)(c) (1987).

62.

FLA. STAT.

63.

FLA.

ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12C-2.008(5)(a) (1987).

64.

FLA.

ADMIN. CoDE ANN. r. 12C-2.008(5)(c) (1987).
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Authorization to Collect Information from Foreign Tax Sources

One of the strongest information collection devices that the Department of Revenue has at its disposal is the legislative authorization
to share and collect information from government tax sources outside
the State of Florida. 611 The Department of Revenue is authorized to
make tax information available to a variety of non-Florida government
agencies, including the United States Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and tax collectors of other states. 66 Such data may
be provided in compliance with "any formal agreement for the mutual
exchange of state information," 67 and may only be provided for official
purposes. 68 Hence, the Department of Revenue may exchange state collected information (presumably including data concerning taxpayers of
the intangible tax) 69 for information from the Internal Revenue Service
or non-Florida state taxing authorities to aid inter alia in the collection
of the intangible property tax. The Department of Revenue has a
strong arsenal of data collection devices at its disposal to collect and
enforce the intangible personal property tax.
Ironically, taxpayer information is protected once it is collected by
the Department of Revenue. 70 Taxpayer information may be shared by
the Department of Revenue only under limited circumstances,71 though
one such circumstance involves information sharing between jurisdictions.72 Even when taxpayer data stored by the Department of Revenue
are required for criminal investigation purposes, a subpoena duces tecum is necessary. 73 Despite these limits, the Department of Revenue is
still capable of collecting information on taxpayers from a variety of
sources, and the privacy of individuals in Florida is compromised by
the Department of Revenue, even though the Florida Constitution provides individuals with protection from some of the information gathering techniques of the Department of Revenue.
65. FLA. STAT. § 213.053(5) (Supp. 1988). Phone conversations with the Department of
Revenue confirm that the Department of Revenue has an information sharing contract with the
Internal Revenue Service.
66. ld. The Internal Revenue Service is required to open for inspection certain federal tax
returns. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(d) (1982). Inspection may be made by state taxing authorities for the
purpose of administering state tax laws. !d. State officers who inspect federal tax returns must
protect the confidentiality of any information gathered from federal returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 7213
(1982).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(d)(1982).
68. /d.
69. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.222 and 213.053(6) (Supp. 1988).
70. /d.
71. See generally FLA. STAT. § 213.053(6) (Supp. 1988).
72. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
73. FLA. STAT. § 213.05(1) (Supp. 1988).

55]

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

IV.

61

THE FLORIDA CoNSTITUTION PROTECTS PRIVACY

Information gathering by agencies of the State of Florida, including the Department of Revenue, must be carefully scrutinized because
the Florida Constitution in Article I, Section 23 provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This
section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to
public records and meetings as provided by law." 74
Art. I, § 23 was passed by a vote of the people of Florida on
November 4, 1980,75 having been placed on the ballot by the Florida
Legislature. 76 The provision became effective in January 1981. 77 A
provision with almost the same wording was one part of a major overhaul of the Florida Constitution 78 that was defeated in November
1978. 79 The differences between the version defeated in 1978 and the
version passed. in 1980 are minimal. 80 The fact of the similarity between the two versions is important to an interpretation of the 1980
version. Either the drafters of the 1978 version are also the drafters of
the 1980 provision that is now law 81 or the drafters of the 1980 version
share the same motivations and intentions as the drafters of the 1978
version. 82 That the intentions of the authors of the 1978 and 1980 versions are the same is important to an interpretation because there is
74. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23 is part of the Declaration of Rights and is entitled "Right of
Privacy."
75. Cope, A Quick Look at Florida's New Right of Privacy, 55 FLORIDA B.J. 12, 12 (1981).
76. FLA. CoNST. art. XI, § I provides that constitutional revisions "may be proposed by joint
resolution agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the legislature." For legislative action on Art. I, § 23. See 1980 FLA. LAWS HousE joiNT RESOLUTION 387.
77. See FLA. CoNST. art. XI, § S(c).
78. See appendix, Revised Constitution of the State of Florida as Proposed by the Constitution Revision Commission, Appendix, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1173, 1176 (1978).
79. Cope, A Quick Look at Florida's New Right of Privacy, supra note 75, at 12.
80. The wording of the first sentence which constitutes the substance of the provision is the
same in both versions. The 1980 version added a second sentence preserving certai'l public records
and open meetings statutes.
81. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). Justice
Rosemary Barkett discusses the concerns of the drafters of the 1980 provision. Barkett's discussion
can be read as identifying the 1980 drafters as the same as the 1978 drafters because the Justice
reviews the proceedings of the 1977-78 Constitutional Revision Commission. According to this
view, the 1980 Legislature simply placed the 1978 version on the ballot with an additional sentence. /d. at 536.
82. See South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d at 536. Justice Barkett refers to the
proceedings of the 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission as revealing the concerns of the
drafters of art. I, § 23. According to this view, the 1980 Legislature accepted the 1978 version,
and the 1980 Legislature can be seen as the drafter of the provision. Hence, even though the
Legislature can be viewed as the independent drafter who just depended on the work of others,
Justice Barkett envisions the Legislature as responding to and incorporating the concerns and
intent of those who drafted the original version that was defeated in 1978.
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good source material from the drafting of the 1978 verswn that aids in
understanding the 1980 provision. 83

A.

The Right of Privacy is a Limited Right

Florida's constitutional right of privacy provides narrow protections.84 Art. I, § 23 protects only natural persons, and, therefore, does
not protect corporations or associations. 811 It is not clear whether a partnership or joint venture is protected. 86 What is clear is that security
brokers 87 as corporate entities68 are not protected by Art. I, § 23 from
83. Two such sources have proved invaluable. Both are written by the same author, who
worked with the 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission. These are: Notes, Toward A Right
of Privacy as A Matter State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 633 (1977) and Cope, To
Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 673 (1978). The later
article is particularly helpful in interpreting Art. I, § 23, and this author depends on Cope's
fundamental analyses throughout this article. However, the author disagrees with Cope on a number of crucial points, and one such point provides a basic disagreement critical to this article. Cope
argues that the 1978 version of the right of privacy should have little or no impact on the State of
Florida's taxing power:
One critic of the right of privacy suggested that it could undermine the ability of the
state to govern through the police power and the taxing power. There is no basis at all
for this concern since the taxing power of the State exists through express constitutional
provision which would not be undercut by a coequal right of privacy.
Cope, To Be Let Alone:, supra note 85, at 770. Cope does not support his assertion, which is
inconsistent with the basic thesis of his article. Cope proposes that the Florida courts adopt a
compelling state interest standard in interpreting the right of privacy provision in order to prevent
constitutional grants of power to state entities from negating the right to privacy. See id. at 749.
Why the power to tax is more important than another state power is unclear. This author finds
nothing to support Cope's assertion and wonders whether Cope was attempting to calm opponents
of the 1978 proposal. Cope reveals his own ideological commitment to the adoption in Florida of a
constitutionally protected right of privacy in the biographical footnote, To Be Let Alone:, supra
note 83, when Cope states: "The author testified before the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission, urging it to place a freestanding right of privacy in the revision proposal."
84. For excellent overviews of Art. I, § 23 as a newly enacted provision, See Cope, To Be Let
Alone:, supra note 83 and Note, Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, 33
U. FLA. L. REV. 565 (1981). Both articles provide suggestions to the Florida courts on how to
interpret the new privacy right.
85. See Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, supra note 84, at 572.
86. See Cope, To Be Let Alone:, supra note 83, at n.411, where Prof. Kurland is quoted as
writing, "When the affairs regulated are not those of individuals but those of groups, the concern
is not privacy." Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAGAZINE, Autumn 1976, at 34.
By quoting Kurland, Cope is arguing that the right of privacy is restricted or non-existent
when applied to economic organizations. Kurland seems to be applying his thesis to "corporations,
classes, organizations, and associations." /d.
It is not clear that Kurland applies his thesis to partnerships and joint ventures, which are
much more personal than corporations or associations. Partnership and joint venture privacy interests would seem to be a sum of all the privacy interests of the individuals involved, while the
privacy interests of corporations or associations would seem to relate to an entity separate from the
corporation's owners or workers.
87. FLA. STAT. § 517.021 (1987).
88. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.021(9)(a)(1) and 517.021(16) (1987). Under the Florida Securities
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disclosing a customer position statement to the Department of Revenue.89 Security brokers as individuals90 are protected by the constitutional right of privacy, but it is doubtful whether they have a protected
privacy interest in their customers' position statements, although individual and corporate brokers may have standing to protect their customers' individual rights of privacy. 91 In any event, it is clear that Art.
I, § 23 applies to individual customers of brokers. Individual people
have a right to be let alone, which means a right to privacy. 92 What
constitutes privacy is not apparent in the words of the constitutional
provision, but there is a reference to "private life." Though there is no
easy definition of "private life," this indefinite concept rests on an individual's expectation of privacy93 or intention to keep information private.94 An expectation of privacy is divorced from whether a physical
setting is considered a private one,911 and depends on whether the overall circumstances allow the individual to reasonably foresee, predict, or
believe that private circumstances exist. 96 The test is at least partially a
subjective one as the limits of individual privacy can be determined only
and Investor Protection Act, a dealer may be a natural person, corporation, partnership, association joint-stock company, or unincorporated organization.
89. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(3) (1987).
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
91. See City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1985). The Del Percio
Court holds that the owner of a bar does not have standing to assert on behalf of bar patrons that
a city ordinance violates the First Amendment, because the patron behavior that the bar owner
seeks to protect from prosecution is not protected by the First Amendment over-breadth cases. 476
So. 2d at 202-3. Del Percio does not apply to an Art. I, § 23 case, because the individual brokerage customer is protected by Art. I, § 23. Florida Medical Association v. Dep't of Professional
Regulation, 426 So. 2d 1112,1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), holds that an optometrist's patient
does not have standing to challenge a regulation permitting optometrists to issue prescriptions
because the patient could avoid optometrists and patronize opthamologists. 426 So. 2d at 1114 n.4.
Hence, the patient was not injured by the new regulation, because he could choose to obtain eye
care from another source that also had the authority to issue prescriptions. Florida Medical Association does not apply to stock brokers challenging Art. I, § 23 on behalf of customers because the
brokers will be out of business without customers. The relation is very different from that of
patient-optometrist. There is no way for a brokerage customer to avoid the intangible property tax
or obtain brokerage services from alternate sources. Hence, unlike in Florida Medical Association
a broker's challenge to Art. I, § 23 would not be "speculative, nonspecific, and hypothetical." ld.
92. See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983}, where
C. J. Alderman, for the Court, discusses the interest protected by Art. I, § 23 as the "constitutional right of privacy."
93. See State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), where the Court attempts to define whether an individual has a right to privacy while he discusses criminal activity
with a family member in an interrogation room being monitored and videotaped by law enforcement officers. The individual had asserted his Miranda rights. J. Barkett, for the Court, bases her
analysis on both Art. I, §§ 12 and 23. Art. I, § 12 protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
94. Shaktman v. State of Florida, 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY 522, 523 (Fla. 1989).
95. 479 So. 2d at 244.
96. Id.
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by the individual. The Florida courts appear to be combining subjective
and objective tests by focusing on individual intentions and whether "in
most instances the individual has no intention of communicating to a
third party." 97
The Florida Constitution does not protect against every violation
of privacy, but only those that are governmental intrusions. 98 Moreover, there must be governmental action. 99 What constitutes a governmental intrusion is another question. A request to an individual by a
state agency or court for health data is considered at least "a limited
intrusion." 100 The Department of Revenue's requirement that securities brokers provide financial data on individual customers constitutes
at least a minimal intrusion into the private lives of individual
customers. 101
The constitutional right to privacy is limited by other provisions of
the Florida Constitution because Art. I, § 23 includes the limitation
"except as otherwise provided herein." This exception could be read as
swallowing up or completely negating the privacy right. All grants of
power in the Florida Constitution to Florida government could be
viewed as providing agencies the authority to gain whatever data are
needed to fulfill their missions. 102 In other words, a general grant of
authority could imply that an agency has the power to collect appropriate data to aid that agen~y in meeting its duties. Therefore, a general
constitutional grant of authority to collect necessary data is implied.
There are two problems with this view. First, such a view negates the
intent of the drafters of the privacy provision because "there can be no
doubt that the Florida amendment was intended to protect the right to
determine whether or not sensitive information about oneself will be
disclosed to others." 103 The provision is intended "to afford individuals
some protection against the increasing collection, retention, and use of
information relating to all facets of an individual's life. " 104 The restric97. Shaktman, supra note 94.
98. Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 742.
99. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983).
100. ld.
101. See infra notes 162-227 and accompanying text.
102. Cope expresses this concern when he writes:
The privacy section ends with the phrase 'except as otherwise provide herein.' This
phrase could be taken to have another meaning, apart from its intended purpose of
sustaining open government. The phrase could be read to indicate that the right to be
let alone is absolute - except when governmental action is authorized by some other
constitutional section. Under this approach, one seeks to justify governmental activity
by ransacking the constitution for the controlling section.
Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 749.
103. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
104. Id.
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tion of the privacy right to only those areas of government to which the
Florida Constitution does not make an explicit grant of governmental
authority means that the drafters proposed a weak and meaningless
constitutional protection.
Second, such a view undermines the privacy right as a "fundamental right," 1011 relegating it to no more than a personal right to be balanced against equally weighted governmental authority. 106 An individual right that is easily outweighed by a general grant of governmental
authority is not much of a right and certainly not a fundamental right.
The drafters of the privacy provision rejected such an equal weighing
when they "rejected the use of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwarranted' before the phrase governmental intrusion." 107 In fact, this right
of privacy is intended to be a right which is "as strong as possible. " 108
The words "except as otherwise provided herein" must mean
something. They were added for a reason. If these words do not refer to
general constitutional grants of authority / 09 then they refer to constitutional provisions that specifically require that individual data or information be reported to the State of Florida or be made public. 110 If Art.
I, § 23 does not provide for such an exception, any constitutional provision in existence in 1980 which specifically provides for data collection
implicitly is repealed or at least curtailed by the new right of privacy.
Such a result undercuts guarantees of responsive and responsible government such as financial disclosures required of public officers and
candidates, m disclosure of campaign financing/ 12 publication of legislative journals, 113 reports of judicial discipline, 114 and information
about judicial appointments.m When the privacy provision originally
was proposed in 1978, the language "except as otherwise provided
herein" was "inserted to make clear that the right of privacy does not
undercut the constitutional provisions relating to financial disclosure,
public records, and open meetings." 116 However, the public records and
open meetings provisions were defeated in 1978 along with all the pro105. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985). See In
Re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989).
106. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 749-50.
107. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
108. !d.
109. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
II 0. A number of such sections exist. See notes infra 111-15 and accompanying text.
Ill. FLA. CoNST. art. II, § 8(a) (1987).
112. FLA. CoNST. art. II, § 8(b) (1987).
113. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § 4(c) (1987).
114. FLA. CoNST. art. V, § 12(d) (1987).
115. FLA. CoNST. art. V, § ll(d) (1987).
116. Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 743.
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posed amendments to the Florida Constitution. 117
The Florida Constitution does not include a specific requirement
or grant of authority to the Department of Revenue to force individuals
or brokers serving individuals to report financial data on a blanket or
automatic basis to the State of Florida. 118 The tax provisions of the
Constitution do not read like a grant of power to tax, 119 but read like
limitations on the power of the State and its local governments to
tax. 120 Implicitly, only the State is provided the exclusive authority to
raise an int&ngible personal property tax, 121 though the State of Florida
has inherent sovereign power to tax 122 "subject only to controlling constitutional limitations." 123 This inherent taxing power is legislative
power. 124 The Constitution specifically grants the Florida Legislature
its power to legislate. 1211 That broad grant of legislative power cannot
be what Art. I, § 23 is referring to "as otherwise provided herein." If
Art. I, § 23 refers to such a broad grant of power, the Legislature can
override the constitutional right of privacy simply by legislating. The
right of privacy no longer would be "fundamental" but would be defined solely by the Legislature. At the same time, the constitutional
limitations on taxing authority cannot serve as grants of authority referred to as "otherwise provided herein," because such a reading is illogical. A limitation on authority runs counter to a grant of authority,
and a limitation of the authority of the sovereign can not be read as
weakening a fundamental right such as the right of privacy.

B.

The Right of Privacy is Applied to Limited Circumstances

The Florida courts apply or refuse to apply the state constitutional
rigbt to privacy in two contexts: public disclosure of personal matters
and personal decision-making. 126 The personal decision category involves two distinct types of cases. First, soon after the constitutional
117. Art. I, § 23 includes a final sentence providing, "[t]his section shall not be construed to
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." Hence, the
right of privacy does not restrict open government statutes such as FLA. STAT. Ch. 119.
118. See FLA. CoNST. art. VII (1987) which authorizes finance and taxation for the state
and local governments in Florida.
119. FLA. CoNST. art. VII,§ !(a) (1985).
120. !d. Art. VII begins, "[n]o tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law."
121. /d.
122. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 381 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). See also Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County, 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1972).
123. 381 So. 2d at 1110.
124. /d.
125. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § I (1987) provides: "[t]he legislative power of the state shall be
vested in a legislature of the State of Florida .... "
126. In Re T.W., 14 FLA. LAW WEEKLY 531, 532 (Fla. 1989).
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amendment became effective, 127 criminal defendants asserted that activities which could be characterized as victimless crimes such as drug
possession or trafficking were protected from state interference, specifically criminal prosecution. 128 Florida declined to recognize such a privacy protection unlike at least one other state with a state constitutional
right of privacy. 129 The Florida courts dismissed the criminal appellants privacy arguments without explanation although in one case stating, "no compelling argument has been made in support .... " 130 Second, actions involving personal health are protected by Art. I, § 23.
These actions involve decision-making about refusaP 31 or discontinuation of medical procedures. 132 The Florida courts are especially protective of the right of individuals to refuse medical treatment or order
treatment discontinued even to the point of holding "that right extends
to incompetent persons who are unable to exercise the right in their
own behalf." 133 Hence, a person has the right to order the discontinuation of the nasogastric feeding of his or her terminally ill spouse/ 34 and
a woman has the right to abort a fetus. 1311
The public disclosure of personal matters category includes three
types of information or data. First, personal knowledge about or observations of criminal activity are not protected by Art. I, § 23 from investigation or interrogation by state investigative officers. 136 Second, personal information concerning health or emotional problems is protected
from disclosure/ 37 though an individual waives that protection when he
or she seeks an office of public trust. 138 Last, data related to personal
finances 138 and day-to-day transactions 140 are protected, though there
are circumstances that require that such data be disclosed to state inves127. Two cases involving controlled substances reached the appellate stage in 1982.
128. See Maisler v. State, 425 So. 2d 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) petition for rev. den.
434 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1983); State v. Ralston, 422 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
129. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
130. Maisler v. State, 425 So. 2d at 108.
131. See Wons v. The Public Health Trust of Dade, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); St. Mary's
Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
132. See In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla.
1986).
133. 487 So. 2d at 370.
134. Id.
135. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
136. In re Getty, 427 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
137. See South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
138. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1983).
139. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
140. See Shaktman v. State of Florida, 14 FLA. LAw WEEKLY 522 (Fla. 1989).

68

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

tigators. 141 Overall, the public disclosure category applies to personal
information that people normally and understandably want to keep private. Disclosure of such information could create professional or employment problems/ 42 impact an individual's private property interests/43 or open a person's private habits to public review. a•
The public disclosure category cases have created conceptual
problems for the Florida courts. 1411 The courts have been forced to focus
to some extent on the location where the communication occurs. Communication that occurs in a location that is considered public, such as a
store, is not protected from surveillance. 146 However, under certain circumstances, a conversation between relatives that occurs in an interrogation room is protected. a 7 In these cases individual expectations about
privacy are especially critical. 148

C.

The Reluctance to Define a Standard of Review

For almost five years the Florida courts refused to determine what
standard of review to apply to the new constitutional right of privacy.
The standard of review was among the first issues debated by the drafters of the original 1978 version. 149 There was fear that the Florida
courts might dilute the right of privacy by "deciding cases on their particular facts or in an unarticulated process of balancing." 1110 Some privacy provision supporters even believed that a compelling interest test
was too weak. 1111 Other states that have adopted a state constitutional
right of privacy have used either a compelling state interest testl 112 or a
weaker means-ends test. 1113
141. Winfield, 477 So. 2d 544.
142. See Bar Examiners, 443 So. 2d 71, where an applicant to the Florida Bar refused to
answer questions about health and emotional problems. The Florida Bar, in turn, refused to process the applicant's application creating a delay for the applicant in obtaining employment as a
licensed attorney.
143. See Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 545, where a state regulatory agency questioned the ownership of racehorses.
144. See Shaktman, 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY at 522, where criminal investigators utilized a pen
register at a residence.
145. See Adams v. State, 436 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
146. /d. at 1133.
147. See State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
148. !d. at 244. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548
(Fla. 1985).
149. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at
724.
150. /d. at 725.
151. !d.
152. Id. at 745. Montana includes a compelling interest standard in the words of the privacy
provision. MoNT. CoNST. Art. II, § 10.
153. /d. at 746. Alaska has opted for the means-ends test. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494
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After Florida enacted Art. I, § 23, the Florida courts used a variety of means to avoid developing a standard of review. One court found
in the context of marijuana possession that an individual asserting his
or her privacy right has to make a compelling argument in support of
that right being applied. 1114 Other courts dismissed the assertion of a
privacy right either by finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
under the circumstances 11111 or by interpreting the intent of the Florida
voters when they passed the right of privacy provision. 1118 Even when
posed with an opportunity to decide what standard to apply, the Florida Supreme Court declined to do so by finding "[ w )e need not make
that decision ... since ... we find that the Board's action meets even
the highest standard of the compelling state interest test." 1117
Finally, at the end of 1985, the Florida Supreme Court applied a
compelling state interest test, 1118 finding that "[ t )his test shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy." 1119 However, even a year after deciding to apply a strict scrutiny standard, the
Florida Supreme Court remained diffident in applying the test/ 80
though the court reaffirmed that the compelling state interest standard
is appropriate for " ... a review of state action that infringes privacy
rights under Article I, § 23." 181

V.

THE TAX REPORTING AND DATA COLLECTION PROVISIONS
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The stockbroker reporting 182 and the foreign taxing authority information sharing provisions 188 are unconstitutional as violations of the
(Alaska. 1975).
154. Maisler v. State, 425 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
155. Adams v. State, 436 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
156. In re Getty, 427 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
157. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983).
158. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
159. /d. at 547.
160. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla 1987),
where the court finds that a court "need not engage in the stricter scrutiny mandated by constitutional analysis. We find that the interests involved here adequately protected under our discovery
rules .... " The court's desire not to reach a constitutional issue where there are grounds for a
decision based on rules is respectable. However, it is peculiar that the Court then incorporates
very weighty federal and state constitutional policy considerations in its analysis. In fact, Rasmussen is one of the best discussions of Art. I, § 23. The court easily could have decided Rasmussen
on state constitutional privacy right grounds, but for some reason masked its constitutional decision
by a procedural decision.
161. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535.
162. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(3) (1987). See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
163. FLA. STAT. § 213.053(5) (Supp. 1988). See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
An argument could be made that Art. I, § 23 does not apply to any information gathered from the
Internal Revenue Service because Congress authorized such information gathering by state govern-
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Florida State constitutional right of privacy. 164 The second category of
state constitutional privacy cases 1611 decided by the Florida courts, the
public disclosure of private information cases/ 66 applies most directly
to the tax reporting and foreign data sharing provisions. The Florida
courts hold that the state has to make a strong showing to justify requiring an individual to provide information to a state agency.
In Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 167 the Florida
Supreme Court found that the state constitutional privacy provision
"recognizes an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy in financial institution records.m 68 Winfield involved an investigation by the
Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering which believed that a "private citizen did not actually own the racehorses as he had reported and
that his ownership was really a front for other members of his family
and/or closely held family corporations.m 69 The Division of PariMutuel Wagering, as part of its investigation, subpoenaed the individual's bank records without providing notice to the individual. 170
First, it is remarkable that the supreme court characterizes the
privacy expectations as extending to "financial institution records." The
court characterizes the bank records this way at least twice/ 71 and opts
not to view Winfield in narrow terms as applying only to bank records.
The court could view Winfield narrowly because the Winfield privacy
analysis begins with United States v. Miller, 172 a bank record subpoena
case. The court also discusses the inapplicability of another bank record
case, Meholnick v. First National Bank. 173 The court could easily focus only on the bank record aspect of the case and how Meholnick and
Miller does or does not apply to the Winfield circumstances. Instead,
ments by enacting 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982). The supremacy clause, Article VI of the United
States Constitution, would require that effect be given to the mandate that the I.R.S. share information with the states. Such an argument fails because the words of 26 U.S.C. 6103 limit the state
authority to inspect to the extent that state law allows such inspections. "Returns ... shall be
open to inspection by, or disclosure to, any state agency ... which is charged under the laws of
such State with the responsibility for the administration of State tax laws for the purpose of ...
the administration of such laws . . . " 26 U.S.C. § 6103(d) (1982). The Florida Department of
Revenue is charged with the collection of taxes. See FLA. STAT.§ 20.21, (1985). But that charge
or authorization is limited by the Florida Constitution, See, e.g, FLA. CoNST. art. VII.
164. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23, See supra notes 74-159 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 136-148 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
167. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
168. !d. at 548.
169. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Winfield, 443 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
170. !d.
171. 477 So. 2d at 547, 548.
172. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) discussed in Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
173. 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) discussed in Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 546-47.
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the court paints a broader picture, applying broad historical privacy
considerations 174 along with Art. I, § 23 to a wide class of financial
records. Winfield is applicable to stock brokerage records, as brokerage
houses are financial institutions or, at least, act in that capacity. 1711
Second, the Winfield court requires that the Division of PariMutuel Wagering bear the burden of proof to "justify an intrusion of
privacy" under the compelling state interest standard. 176 The Division
of Pari-Mutuel Wagering succeeded at bearing that burden by showing
that the state has a compelling interest in conducting effective investigations in the pari-mutuel industry. 177 The court characterizes the work
of the Pari-Mutuel Wagering agency as "regulation." 178 Though the
court does not focus on the general circumstances of the case in its analysis, it does mention that the trial court found that there was probable
cause to institute the investigation. 179 The court also discusses the existence of the subpoena. 180 The Winfield court finds that the privacy provision does not apply where a state agency is carrying out a regulatory
function, the agency has probable cause to believe that an individual
who falls under the agency's regulatory powers has violated statutes
and regulations, and the agency uses a subpoena. As to financial
records protected by the privacy provision, the Winfield court holds
broadly, but as to what state actions are permissible under the privacy
provision, the Winfield court holds narrowly.
In Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 181 the supreme court found that the right of privacy protects information about
"private life." 182 In Bar Examiners, an applicant to the Florida Bar
refused to answer a question relating to treatment for mental health
174. The court starts its overall analysis in Winfield with a quote from Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The court then reviews the federal
privacy cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 118 (1973) concluding that the federal cases are not
applicable to Winfield and that " ... [i]n formulating privacy interests, the Supreme Court has
given much of the responsibility to the individual states." 477 So. 2d at 547.
175. See, e.g., Rudd v. State, 386 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) where the Court
distinguishes between a loan and a security. In distinguishing the two transactions, the Court
concedes "[T]he term 'loan' and 'investment' are often used when referring to the same type of
transaction." /d. at 1219. Rudd revolves around defining differences between similar financial
activities. The court is posed with actions that could be viewed either as a loan, an activity primarily carried out by banks or individuals, or as a sale of a security, an activity primarily carried out
by a stock dealer.
176. 477 So. 2d at 547.
177. /d. at 548.
178. /d. at 547.
179. Id. at 546.
180. /d. at 546, 548.
181. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
182. /d.
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problems in the Bar Examiner's application. 183 The court found that
the Bar Examiner's request for information met "the highest standard
of the compelling state interest test," 184 though the court declined in the
1983 case to state whether the strict scrutiny standard is applicable to
Art. I, § 23.m The Bar Examiners fulfilled their heavy burden under
strict scrutiny by showing "an important societal need." 186 In this case
the societal need involves ensuring the fitness of those who apply to
practice law. 187 Further, the Bar Examiners, as a state agency/ 88 protect the public by assuring that those whom the Bar Examiners allow
to assume positions of public trust and responsibility are capable of
coping with the mental and emotional pressures inherent in legal practice.189 To fulfill their obligation to the public, the Bar Examiners require a wide range of candidate data. 190 The court found that personal
information about mental health is not protected by the state constitutional right to privacy in the general context where "the state has a
compelling state interest in regulating the legal profession .... " 191 The
court also recognized that a candidate to the Bar volunteers to apply for
a privilege from the State; 192 therefore, the candidate holds himself or
herself open to intimate, though focused, inquiry. 193
Bar Examiners is decided similarly to Winfield. First, the court
applies the protection of the right of privacy to a wide category activity,
"private life," avoiding a narrow view of the case as impacting only
psychological or health information. Second, the court requires that a
state agency have a specialized, regulatory reason for requiring the disclosure of information. However, the court in Bar Examiners focuses
on societal needs and impacts in assessing whether a compelling state
purpose exists. The court does not use such an analysis in Winfield,
possibly because the societal needs are implied in the nature of the
pari-mutuel statutory and regulatory scheme that requires "effective
investigations. " 194
183. /d. at 72-3.
184. Id. at 74.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. ld. at 75.
188. /d. at 74.
189. /d. at 75.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Court discusses how the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) recognizes the states' compelling interest in regulating the Bar.
192. 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983).
193. Id.
194. 477 So. 2d at 548.
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Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 1911 decided in
1987, adds a new element to the state constitutional right of privacy
analysis. In Rasmussen, the court reviewed the impact of disclosure of
personal information on an individual's life. 196 This is unlike Winfield
and Bar Examiners where the court focuses on the state's justifications
for requiring the disclosure of data. In Rasmussen, a victim contracted
AIDS from blood transfusions required as a result of an automobile
accident. While suing the driver of the automobile that injured him,
Rasmussen sought blood donor records from a local blood bank. 197 The
court found through its analyses of the privacy interests involved that
"[d]isclosure of donor identities in any context involving AIDS could be
extremely disruptive and even devastating to the individual donor." 198
By reviewing the impact of disclosure on the individual, the court
is not receding from the requirements of Winfield and Bar Examiners
that the State carry the burden of justifying the need for disclosure.
The court states, "[t]his opinion in no way changes or dilutes the compelling state interest standard appropriate to a review of state action . . . . »~ 99 The court does not use a compelling state interest standard because "the interests involved here are adequately protected
under our discovery rules. . . ." 200
It would be easy to dismiss Rasmussen as a discovery rule case not
relevant to a constitutional right of privacy analysis. However, the supreme court places great emphasis on Art. I, § 23 in deciding Rasmussen, 201 and extensively reviews the history and policy underlying the
constitutional right to privacy. 202 The impact of disclosure on an individual's life appears to be the crux of the court's privacy interest analysis. Though the court reviews the impact of the discovery rules on the
case, that review focuses narrowly in breadth on the discovery request
in Rasmussen. 203 The court finds "the subpoena in question gives petitioner access to the names and addresses of the blood donors with no
restrictions on their use." 204 The impact of disclosure involves the risk
that friends and employers may learn about the information, 2011 and the
court does not limit its sensitivity to the impact of disclosure to the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
at 537.
at 534.
at 537.
at 535.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 536-37.
at 537.
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context of AIDS. "[T]he importance of protecting the privacy of donor
information does not depend on the stigma associated with
AIDS . . . . " 206
Shaktman v. State of Florida 207 is a criminal case involving bookmaking, conspiracy, and racketeering. Police used a pen register after
court approval to record phone numbers at the home of a suspect. 206
The Florida Supreme Court in Shaktman clarified the underlying philosophy of Art. I, § 23. A goal of the privacy provision is to encourage
independence and individualism by creating a zone of privacy into
which government may not enter without consent. What is assured is
the inviolability of thought, action, and the person. The right to privacy
protected by Art. I, § 23 is so strong that its inviolability is preeminent
"over 'majoritarian sentiment' and thus can not be universally defined
by consensus." 209 Personal intention and expectation are essential to
defining what is included in the zone of privacy because the limits of an
individual's privacy is dictateq both by the individual and what is reasonable.210 As a result, pen register data are still protected even though
the telephone company maintains similar records. What is critical is the
expectation that the government will receive the information and not
just that other people or a corporation in the course of its business will
receive the information.
The Shaktman court found that Art. I, § 23 protects telephonic
communications made from a residence. 211 At the same time, the court
failed to apply the protections of Art. I, § 23 to the criminal defendants
in Shaktman. The court found that a compelling state interest existed
where the state demonstrates a clear connection between illegal activity
and a person whose privacy is being invaded. A legitimate, ongoing
criminal investigation creates a compelling state interest so long as a
reasonable founded suspicion that the communication or private information is being used for a criminal purpose exists. 212 Also, the state
must use the least intrusive method to obtain the information, 213 and
must observe procedural safeguards such as judicial approval prior to
an intrusion into a person's privacy. 214
The public disclosure of personal information category of privacy
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

!d.
14 FLA. L. WEEKLY 522 (Fla. 1989).
Id. at 522.
!d. at 523.
!d.
/d.
/d.

/d. at 524.
/d.
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right cases limits the privacy right protection where a state agency
needs to investigate the activities of individuals. However, this need to
investigate overcomes the privacy right only in prescribed circumstances. First, the agency must be involved in critical regulatory functions that safeguard the public from harm. The Bar Examiners assure
that prospective attorneys will not injure the public interest, while the
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering guards against abuses in an industry that involves not only sport but also gambling and animals. Dishonest attorneys could injure individual lives and property while dishonest
racehorse owners could foster cheating, corruption and cruelty to
animals.
Second, the need to investigate is based on statutory or regulatory
provisions aimed at regulating specific behavior such as lawyer conduct,
horse racing, and criminal activity. In order for a state agency to collect
data, there must be either a violation of a statute or regulation or an
individual applying for or receiving a privilege under a statute or regulation that protects the public trust and confidence. In fact, the public
disclosure cases involve either criminal conduct or voluntary acquiescence to state regulation as in horse racing and the practice of law. In a
sense, a criminal violation is a voluntary acquiescence to state regulation because those who commit crimes take the risk that they will be
prosecuted by a state agency. The public disclosure cases also involve
the existence of reasonable founded suspicion and at least two cases
involve subpoenae. 2111
The right of privacy is not limited by the Department of Revenue's general need for information about a taxpayer because the Department's data collection needs do not fit within the exception to the
right of privacy protection carved by the public disclosure cases. The
Department of Revenue is involved in tax collection, 216 and that is not
a critical regulatory function safeguarding the public from harm. There
is no industry oversight involved in tax collection functions. Taxpayers
cannot be likened to racehorse owners or candidates to the Bar. Though
taxpayers may have a generalized duty to pay the intangible property
tax, 217 such a duty does not involve the same public trust and confidence expected of an attorney. The taxpayer is closer to "the tradesman
and businessmen" 218 against whom attorneys are contrasted by the Bar
Examiners court.
215. In re Getty, 427 So. 2d 380, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Winfield v. Division of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1985).
216. FLA. STAT.§ 20.21 (1987).
217. See FLA. STAT. § 199.052 (1987).
218. 443 So. 2d at 75.
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An argument can be made that taxpaying is a regulated activity to
which all people who own intangible property voluntarily submit and
which involves tax evasion. It can be argued that the Department of
Revenue has a compelling need to catch evaders, and that all intangible
property owners must submit themselves to scrutiny to assure that they
are not evaders. But such an argument undercuts the whole idea of the
state constitutional right of privacy as a basic right. 219 All the state
must show, under that argument, is that tax collection is a compelling
state purpose. However, such a showing means that any important
state function is a compelling state purpose that can overcome the right
of privacy, and the fears of the framers of the privacy provision concerning a watered down standard of review are realized. 220 This basic
right is transformed into an individual interest that can be outweighed
easily by a countervailing state interest. 221 Taxpaying is not an industry like horse racing or the practice of law. That taxpaying is regulated
by a set of laws and rules does not convert the activity into a highly
regulated one any more than laws and rules convert the use of highways, sidewalks, public water supplies, or household garbage pickup
into highly regulated activities. If all that the state must demonstrate
under Art. I, § 23 is that laws and rules exist in an area of human
activity, then most activities would not be accorded protection under
Art. I, § 23. Such an approach would undermine the distinction between highly regulated attorneys and less regulated "tradesmen and
businessmen" made by the Florida Bar Examiners 222 court. The court
allowed the Florida Bar Examiners to probe the medical history of an
attorney candidate because such a person is entering an occupation
with special responsibilities, different from most other service workers.
The closest the Department of Revenue regulatory activity can be
compared to that of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners or the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering would be the discovery of tax evasion.
However, tax evaders do not have the same effect as dishonest attorneys
or racehorse owners. The public suffers when people evade taxes, but
tax evasion is not the same as corruption or dishonesty in a highly
regulated activity or service industry. Taxpayers are not required to
undergo the rigorous scrutiny of licensing or a permit process before
they are allowed to pay their taxes. Taxpayers do not share the special
role in society assigned to professionals such as attorneys who "are es219. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
220. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
221. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at
479. See also supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
222. 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983).
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sential to the primary governmental function of administering justice
and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' " 223 The search for
tax evaders may protect society in a general sense, but can not be said
to protect against the potential dangers in a regulated business such as
the pari-mutuel industry. The Florida pari-mutuel regulatory scheme
works inter alia to "preserve the integrity of the sport of racing from
corruption, to keep the wagering public from being misled, to reduce
the risk of injury and to protect the animals from cruel and inhumane
treatment. " 224
The Department of Revenue may collect data on taxpayers from
stockbrokers or the IRS only if there is reasonable founded suspicion to
believe that a particular taxpayer is cheating. Such activity is criminal
conduct; 2211 therefore, the taxpayer is not shielded by the right of privacy from the data collection procedures of the Department of Revenue.
To allow the Department of Revenue to collect data on every taxpayer
as a matter of standard procedure violates the privacy right requirement that an agency "accomplishes its goals through the use of the least
intrusive means." 226 Not every taxpayer cheats and the Department of
Revenue cannot violate a basic constitutional right on vague and generalized suspicions about widespread cheating. The Department of Revenue may be hampered in its investigatory procedures, and probably will
find it difficult to assure individual compliance with the Intangible Personal Property Tax Act without routine reports from stockbrokers and
the IRS. However, the price of making it easy for the Department of
Revenue to do its job is to disregard a constitutional provision "providing an explicit textual foundation for those privacy interests inherent in
the concept of liberty which may not otherwise be protected by specific
constitutional provisions. " 227
VI.

FLORIDA PRIVACY PROTECTION AS A MonEL FOR OTHER
STATES

This article has examined how Florida's state constitutional pnvacy provision applies to a routine government function, the collection
of taxes. Florida's constitutional provision is a model that could prove
useful to other states. The federal constitution is weakening as a protec223. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) quoted in Florida Board of Bar
Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla. 1983).
224. Simmons v. Division of Pari-Mutuel, 407 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
affd, 412 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1982).
225. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
226. 477 So. 2d at 547; Shaktman v. State of Florida, 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY 522, 523 (Fla.
1989).
227. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
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tion of privacy as the United States Supreme Court retreats from Roe
v. Wade 228 in Bowers v. Hardwick 229 and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services. 230 At the same time, state constitutions are being revitalized as sources of individual rights and protections. 231 Privacy is a
prime area in which state constitutions have a critical role providing
protection from government interference. 232 A few states join Florida in
including express privacy provisions in their state constitutions. 233 On
the other hand, a few state courts have implied a privacy right in state
constitutional provisions that fail explicitly to protect privacy. 234 As the
state constitutional law movement expands and the U.S. Supreme
Court becomes less protective of privacy interests, more states may
want to consider adopting constitutional provisions like Art. I, § 23.
Florida is in the forefront of protecting privacy based on its state
constitution. Even the emotionally charged and highly debated right to
choose an abortion is protected by Art. I, § 23. 2311 If the right to choose
an abortion and to withdraw medical treatment 236 are protected under
Art. I, § 23, then a variety of human activity including paying taxes is
covered by the Florida constitutional privacy rights. As a result, Florida
provides a state constitutional laboratory for the nation. The rationale
of the Florida courts should be helpful in aiding scholars, practitioners
and jurists in other states in developing law under their state constitutions. The challenge will be to develop state constitutional privacy law
that is meaningful in the everyday lives of people. Paying taxes, driving
and using public services are the means by which people relate to their
state and local governments. Placing limits on the powers of state and
local governments in obtaining personal information will secure individual liberty. The Florida constitution provides a model by which all
228. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
229. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
230. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
231. See, e.g., Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING IssuEs
IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1988); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond
the "New Federalism", 8 U. PuGET SouND L. REv. vi (1984); Linde, E PluribusConstitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Williams, In the Supreme
Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35
S.C.L. REV. 353 (1984).
232. See Kempic, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the State Constitutions, 5
CooLEY L. REv. 313 (1988).
233. See ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 1; HAw. CoN ST. art. I, § 5; and
MoNT. CoNST. art. II, § 10.
234. See In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663
(N.J. 1977); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); Moe v. Sec'y of Administration, 417
N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
235. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
236. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
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state governments can ensure that the liberty of their residents is
protected.

VII.

CoNCLUSION

Art. I, § 23, Florida's state constitutional right of privacy, prohibits the Department of Revenue from requiring stockbrokers to report
client financial information and from using information received about
individual taxpayers from the IRS unless the Department of Revenue
has probable cause to believe that a taxpayer is violating the Intangible
Personal Property Tax Act. The right of privacy yields only when a
state agency needs to collect data in order to regulate specific activity
for which individuals volunteer or when there is criminal activity. Taxpaying is not the kind of regulatory activity for which the state can
show a compelling need to regulate and require disclosure of data.
Taxpaying is not criminal activity unless a taxpayer disobeys the tax
act. For the right of privacy to yield when the Department of Revenue
must do no more than demonstrate its job will be made more difficult
means that the state constitutional right of privacy is no longer a basic
right that requires the state to meet the burden of a strict scrutiny test.

